total review

These developments are interconnected.
The ISI has been accused by the
Afghanistan authorities of involvement
in the attack on our Kabul embassy,
a charge levelled by India
too based on independent information.
US sources
have liberally spoken to the media
about the ISI’s role not only in the embassy blast
but also in questionable intelligence dealings
with the Taliban to the detriment of the
military campaign against the grouping.
The seeds of the current conflict in J & K
have been sown,
according to former Chief Minister Azad,
by Saudi and Pakistani money.

India
has maintained that control
over terrorist attacks in J&K and elsewhere
in the country is a pre-requisite for sustaining
the composite dialogue with Pakistan.
If such attacks have been stepped up,
those responsible would have calculated
the risk of the dialogue being interrupted.
It is unlikely that
the civilian government would by design take this risk.
It has enough internal political problems
on its hands to want deterioration on the Indian front.
More so as revival of tensions with India
will strengthen the hands of the military at
a time when the government wants to
assert civilian supremacy over them.

Elements in the armed forces,
however,
would have multiple motives
to create problems for the government.
They would want to obstruct
any rapid normalisation of relations with India,
bearing in mind the positive statements by leaders
of the two main parties on relations with India
while in exile and on return.
Zardari’s statements
advocating improvement of ties with India
and leaving Kashmir to be resolved later generated
adverse reactions in sections of the polity,
compelling some backtracking by the government subsequently.

These elements
would want to hamper any rapid consolidation
of civilian power at a time
when the military’s position is relatively weak.
While it seems that
the new army chief General Kiyani
is inclined to withdraw the military into the background,
aware that the armed forces are currently highly
unpopular with the public,
the acceptance of this changed situation
without some disruptive action
would have been too good to be true.
Having held real power in the country for decades,
the armed forces would not easily permit an erosion
of the strategic policies they have long pursued towards
India and Afghanistan
in the interest of Pakistan’s security.
The existing governmental disarray in Pakistan
gives to these disruptive forces space to pursue their agenda.

The repeated ceasefire violations
in J&K are disquieting.
The firing has not been in all instances
to give cover to infiltrators;
the meeting of local commanders has not ended it.
The persistence of violations after five years
of discipline indicates clearance on the Pakistani side
possibly at corps commander level.
Largely small arms have been used,
though mortar firing has also occurred.
Is the ground being prepared for
a bigger incident at a time of Pakistan’s choosing?

The successive terrorist attacks in Indian cities
seem to be connected to the agenda to disturb
India-Pakistan relations
after the civilian takeover in Pakistan
and efforts of the new government to bring
the ISI under firmer governmental control.
Islamabad
may refute charges that the Government of Pakistan
is officially involved in these attacks
by forces that are now
a threat to the country’s own stability.
The threat of progressive talibanisation of Pakistan
is thought to be real by Pakistanis and foreign observers alike.
Why should Pakistan then promote these forces
against India, ignoring the danger of recoil?

But this is to ignore that elements
sympathetic to these forces exist in the state’s political,
security and administrative setup.
The handling of the Lal Masjid episode reveals
the ambivalence within the system towards them.
The vacillation with which the religious extremists
in the tribal areas continue to be dealt
with is a further demonstration of this.
The failure to close down all terrorist training camps
and the liberty being enjoyed by known jehadis conflicts
with assertions that Pakistan is not guilty of
assistance to terrorist activity in India.
Until there is a genuine strategic transformation
of attitudes in Pakistan towards India,
especially in the armed forces,
the issues bedeviling our relations will remain,
including the encouragement given to jehadis to target India.
The communal fracture in
Indian society lends itself to exploitation.
With religious extremism growing in the region
and elements in Pakistan traditionally hostile
to Hindu India remaining active, our vulnerability increases.
The periodic mayhem in our cities is intended
to weaken us from within.
The attempt to make believe that terrorism in India
is the handiwork of indigenous elements is both
to divert attention away from across-the-border
complicity as well as to demoralise us and widen
the communal divide in the country.
We have had the belief that our democracy
was an insurance against extremism as it tolerated
dissension and even separatist platforms.
If it began to be believed that
local Muslims were,
independently of outside conspiracy,
resorting to the killing of innocent people
in the streets of India to redress their grievances,
the potential backlash could have
grave consequences for our social peace.

Our government seems to have no effective
answer to the growing challenge of terrorism.
Its response to successive incidents fails
to go beyond platitudes,
as if the problem can be solved with condemnation,
compensation and appeals to communal peace.
There is no effort to mobilise a national response
to a national challenge,
to build a national consensus on the source,
nature and dimension of the threat.
Political parties throw blame at each other,
trying to score debating points as if the contention
was between them and not between
the terrorists and the society at large.
The unfortunate fact is that a robust approach
to terrorism has got equated with anti-secularism and
a cautious one with secularism.
To deal with an India-wide challenge,
we have no organisation with an India-wide mandate.

Without clarity,
determination and consensus
internally on how to deal with the terrorist menace,
we can hardly be purposeful
in dealing with the external dimension of the threat.
Our posture is to minimise
the seriousness of the situation facing us as
we lack the resolve to address it forcefully.
We therefore cling to existing policy.